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Abstract
The non take-up of social assistance bene￿ts due to claim costs may seriously limit the anti-poverty
e⁄ect of these programs. Yet, available evidence is fragmented and mostly relies on interview-based
data, potentially biased by misreporting and measurement errors on both bene￿t entitlement and
income levels used to assess eligibility. In this paper, we use Finnish administrative data to compare
eligibility and actual receipt of social assistance by working-age families during the post-recession
period (1996-2003). Possible errors due to time-period issues and discretionary measures by local
agencies are carefully investigated. Non take-up is found to be substantial ￿between 40% and 50%
￿and increasing during the period. Using repeated cross-section estimations, we identify a set of
stable determinants of claiming behavior and suggest that the increasing trend is mainly due to a
composition e⁄ect, i.e. a decline in the proportion of groups with higher claiming propensity. We
￿nally discuss the targeting e¢ ciency of the social assistance scheme.
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xVATT1 Introduction
Most OECD countries operate social assistance (SA) programs designed to secure a minimum level of
resources for low-income families. Yet, the redistributive e⁄ectiveness of such policies can be compromised
if intended recipients end up not claiming bene￿ts. This may be due to informational problems, stigma
e⁄ects or other sorts of explicit or implicit claim costs. A growing literature for Germany, the UK and the
US in particular, e⁄ectively points to a substantial non take-up of social transfers (see surveys of Hernanz
et al., 2004, and Currie, 2004, among others). As a result, evaluations of the cost and anti-poverty e⁄ects
of SA schemes (and reforms thereof) can be seriously biased if they are based on the assumption of full
bene￿t take-up.
SA schemes are particularly generous in Northern Europe but evidence on potential non take-up
issues is rather limited. We address this question by studying relevant claiming patterns in the Finnish
SA scheme (Toimeentulotuki) over 1996-2003. This period is of special interest as it covers the years
following the deep 1990s recession and represents a time that saw signi￿cant changes in labor market
opportunities and the nature of unemployment. We focus on working-age families whose needs and
￿nancial situation make them eligible for regular social assistance.
First, and most important, we compare theoretical bene￿t entitlements with actual bene￿t receipt
for this selected group. Actual receipts are observed using an administrative data source, the Income
Distribution Survey (IDS). Entitlements are simulated using TUJA, the tax-bene￿t calculator maintained
by the Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT) and the Finnish Ministry of Finance. The
algorithms used in the program resemble as closely as possible the relevant entitlement rules as applied
by bene￿t agencies. Household characteristics used to simulate eligibility rules are based on register
information from IDS data and are largely identical to the information used by bene￿t agencies to assess
formal entitlement. Importantly, this allows us to sidestep some of the considerable di¢ culties faced by
researchers using interview-based survey data and permits a stronger focus on other types of measurement
issues. In particular, individual bene￿t authorities have some room for discretion on entitlement levels
and we attempt to throw light on this issue by providing a careful sensitivity analysis of our take-up
measures. In line with several studies for other countries, the resulting micro-economic evidence points
towards signi￿cant degrees of non take-up of SA in Finland ￿about 40-50%. Moreover, receipts show a
declining pattern while the number of eligible caseloads seems relatively stable, leading to an increase in
non take-up rates over the period of interest.
Second, we investigate which types of families are more likely to claim bene￿ts to which they are
entitled. We estimate a simple probit model of non take-up on a detailed set of socio-demographic
characteristics. Estimations are carried out both on pooled years and on each year individually in order
to assess the stability of the estimated coe¢ cients. To explain the increasing trend in non take-up rate
over the period, we decompose the gap in the (estimated) non take-up probability between the initial and
the ￿nal period. We suggest several possible factors, including a change in the composition of the eligible
group, a change in claiming behavior and tighter eligibility conditions linked to ￿ activation￿policies. We
1favor the composition e⁄ect, which is mainly driven by a declining number of long-term unemployed ￿
typically more likely to claim SA ￿within the SA eligible group.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on bene￿t take-up with a
focus on the (limited) evidence from Northern countries. Section 3 discusses the economic and policy
context in Finland and provides an overview of social assistance rules. Section 4 describes the data,
the selection and how theoretical bene￿t entitlements are determined in the baseline simulation; we then
present and discuss non take-up measures (a sensitivity analysis is developed in the Appendix). In Section
5, we estimate the determinants of non take-up behavior and attempt to explain the recent trend. Section
6 concludes.
2 Previous Studies and Present Approach
There is evidence of non take-up for several countries and di⁄erent types of bene￿ts. According to
Hernanz et al. (2004), estimates typically span a range of between 40% and 80% in the case of SA
and housing bene￿t programs, and between 60% and 80% for unemployment compensation. Table 1
speci￿cally reviews some studies on the non take-up of SA and poverty-alleviating transfers. Several
observations stand out. First, non take-up rates across countries and SA schemes vary considerably ￿
certain policy designs are more e⁄ective than other ￿but are always signi￿cant. Second, there are sizable
di⁄erences across studies for the same scheme (e.g. AFDC), which indicates that data and measurement
issues present a fundamental di¢ culty when studying bene￿t take-up. For Germany, however, all studies
report non take-up rates exceeding 50%. This is of particular interest here because the German SA
system is very similar to the Finnish scheme (cf. Bargain and Orsini, 2006).
Contrary to Germany, the UK or the US, there is little empirical evidence on SA bene￿t take-up
in Nordic countries and in Finland in particular. One simple reason could be that the large number of
SA recipients in Finland compared to other countries ￿9% of all households in 2003 according to the
administrative data IDS ￿may convey the idea of a satisfactory targeting of families ￿in need￿ . Yet,
the few available studies on this question support the opposite view. Virjo (2000) uses a small mail
survey of the 1995 Finnish population while Gustafsson (2002) studies self-reported claiming behavior
using Swedish data for the years 1985 and 1997. Both studies ￿nd a very large degree of non take-up as
indicated in Table 1.
In Finland, the Ministry of Social A⁄airs and Health (2006) notes that ￿The recent discussion on the
under-utilization of social protection may indicate that there may be great di⁄erences between households￿
knowledge concerning income security.￿Other o¢ cial reports support Virjo￿ s interpretation of non take-up
as resulting from a stigma e⁄ect. However, the Ministry emphasizes the di¢ culties involved in producing
reliable estimates using interview-based data. Indeed, the latter tend to su⁄er from measurement errors
and in particular from misreporting of income data ￿used to assess bene￿t eligibility ￿and of received
amounts. This limitation applies to most studies reported in Table 1.1 Interview-based surveys tend to
1Other studies use various econometric techniques to control for the existence of measurement error (Duclos, 1995,
2overstate non take-up, as discussed by Hernanz et al. (2004) and shown by Blank (1997) in the case of
the AFDC.
The present study avoids some of these di¢ culties by using administrative data from the Finnish In-
come Distribution Survey (IDS) to identify both eligible families and actual recipients. While information
on income, family characteristics and received SA amounts is particularly reliable, as described below,
we shall devote our attention to address two other types of measurement issues. First, allocation rules
are sometimes only partially observable due to discretionary decisions on the part of bene￿t agencies.
Second, the reference period of available income data (the year, in our case) is not the same as the income
assessment period used by the administration when determining eligibility (the previous month or the
two previous months, depending on the cases).
Table 1: Some Literature on the Non-take-up of Social Assistance
Country Data Years Program* Selection Non-take-up rate
Moffitt (1983) US
Panel Study of Income
Dynamics 1976 AFDC Single mothers 55%
Blank and Ruggles (1996) US
Survey of Income and Program
Participation 1986-87 AFDC Single mothers 30% - 38%
Blank (1997) US
    Current Population Survey
(CPS) and administrative data






Kim and Mergoupis (1997) US
Survey of Income and Program
Participation 1976-88-89 AFDC Working poor 46%
Fry and Stark (1989) UK Family Expenditure Survey 1984 Supplementary Benefit (SB) All 13% - 19%
Pudney et al. (2002) UK Family Resource Survey 1997-2000 Income Support (IS) Pensioners 34% - 35%
Bramley et al. (2000) UK (Scotland)
Scottish House Condition
Survey 1996 Income Support (IS) All 30-50%
Terracol France
European Community
Household Panel 1994-96 Minimum Income (RMI and API) All 35% - 48%
Neuman and Hertz (1998) Germany German socio-economic Panel 1991
Social Assistance (Hilfe zum
Lebensunterhalt) All 52.3% - 58.7%
Kayser and Frick (2000) Germany German socio-economic Panel 1996
Social Assistance (Hilfe zum
Lebensunterhalt) All 62.9%
Riphahn (2001) Germany
Income and Expenditure Survey
(EVS) 1993
Social Assistance (Hilfe zum
Lebensunterhalt) All 62.3%
van Oorschot (1995) Netherlands
data on Rotterdam and
Nijmegen 1990 Special Social Assistance All 53% - 63%
Virjo (2000) Finland Mail survey (U. of Turku) 1995 Social Assistance (Toimeentulotuki) n.a. 60%
Gustafsson (2002) Sweden n.a. 1985, 1997 Social Assistance All 70-80%
Note: AFDC is the Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Supplementary Benefit (SB) is the ancestor of the Income Support (IS) in the UK.
McGarry, 1996, among others).
33 Social Assistance in Finland
3.1 The Economic and Policy Context
In Finland, the deep recession of the early 1990s has caused the loss of nearly half a million jobs, pushing
the unemployment rate from less than 5% to more than 15% and leaving deep scars in the labor market
and beyond. While a period of strong growth in the second half of the 1990s has contributed to a
reduction in unemployment, pre-recession levels have not been restored, as illustrated by Figure 1. The
large changes of aggregate out-of-work ￿gures have been accompanied by changes in the composition of
the unemployed group. In particular, long-term unemployment, o¢ cially de￿ned as being out of work for
12 months or more, has slowly decreased below 25% of total unemployment in 2001. We will exploit later
this change in the nature of unemployment over the period of interest (1996-2003) to explain the trends
in non take-up. Figure 1 ￿nally report available ￿gures for the actual poverty rate (the simulated one
precisely su⁄ers from the assumption of full take-up). According to Riihel￿ et al. (2001), the headcount
ratio of relative poverty decreases during the early 90s because the recession hits middle and high income
as much as poorest groups. While absolute poverty has however increased substantially over the period,
universal social security and welfare assistance have played their role as safety nets, the proportion of
households receiving SA increasing from 6% to 13% of the population. The rise of relative poverty in the
second half of the 90s is explained by a relatively faster recovery for higher income groups.
Understanding the interactions between entitlements to SA and ￿￿rst tier￿unemployment bene￿ts is
also important. As in many countries, Finnish workers with su¢ cient contribution records are entitled
to unemployment insurance bene￿ts for a limited duration of unemployment. The system consists of a
basic mandatory scheme and, like in the Danish and Swedish systems, a voluntary earnings-related top-
up. Both are non-means tested.2 Unemployment assistance, known as Labor Market Support in Finland,
was introduced in 1994. It covers jobseekers who are not entitled to insurance bene￿ts (notably the young
unemployed) or have exhausted their entitlements. It is non-contributory, means-tested (except for older
unemployed aged 55 and above) and not limited in time. The maximum amount of unemployment
assistance is similar to the basic allowance under the unemployment insurance scheme but is reduced
with a means test. Importantly, the resulting entitlements can be topped up by SA bene￿ts.3 In fact,
the concurrent receipt of unemployment and social assistance bene￿t is common, particularly among the
long-term unemployed (see Saarela, 2004). In what follows, we indeed ￿nd that this group has a larger
propensity to claim SA.
2The mandatory scheme provides a basic allowance for those who have worked 43 weeks during the last 24 months with
a minimum of 18 hours a week (2002 ￿gures). The voluntary earnings-related scheme generally expires after 500 days of
unemployment. The basic allowance is a bit less than 23 euro/day and the voluntary earnings-related component adds some
42% of the di⁄erence between the daily wage and the basic allowance (and 20% beyond a certain income limit). Speci￿c
measures are in force for elderly unemployed and restrictions are imposed on younger unemployed.
3Before accounting for any housing-related payments, SA entitlements for a family with two children amounts to around
50% of gross average wages in the manufacturing sector in Finland (2002 ￿gures), compared to 48% in Sweden, 46% in the






































































































Real GDP growth rate (%)
Unemployment rate (%)
Proportion of long-term unemployment (%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%)
SA recipients (% of the population)
Recipient of 'regular' SA (% of the population)
Poverty line: 50% of the median of equivalised income (modified OECD scale).
Sources: OECD; Income Distribution Survey; own calculations.
Figure 1: Growth, Unemployment and Poverty in Finland
3.2 General Features
We focus in this study on SA payments aimed at supporting recurring living expenses of low-income
families, or ￿ regular￿SA. It is paid on a monthly basis and is generally means-tested on the income of
the previous month. The assessment unit is the nuclear family, de￿ned as a single individual or a couple
plus all children under 18. Children over 17, grand parents, other relatives or cohabitants are considered
families of their own (possibly with their own partners and children). It is therefore possible that one
physical household would consist of more than one family and, correspondingly, receive more than one
SA payment.
Subject to relevant income criteria, all private adult persons can apply for SA bene￿ts. In theory,
military and students (during term time) are not entitled to it ￿the case of students is further discussed
in the next Section. SA rules described below are decided at the national level but SA is administered
locally by municipalities. This has two important implications for our study. First, bene￿t agencies
can apply some discretion when deciding whether claimants￿circumstances make them eligible for SA
support. Typically, municipalities are provided with a budget in order to assist families experiencing
situations of particular hardship and whose ￿ needs￿may therefore exceed those de￿ned by national SA
rates. We come back to this important point below. Second, SA regulations allow for a broader set of
transfers than just regular SA. Municipalities can grant one-o⁄ supplements, SA for special situations
(sickness, change in family circumstances and other ￿life events￿ ) and SA in support of re-integration or
rehabilitation measures (cf. Ministry of Social A⁄airs and Health, 2006). A preventative SA bene￿t can
5also be granted by municipalities, for instance to support job-search, ensure housing security or alleviate
sudden problems arising from heavy debts. These other forms of SA, which are typically temporary
and hence characterized by short bene￿t durations, are not explicitly considered in the present study.
Unfortunately, they cannot be identi￿ed in the underlying micro-data since receipt of both regular SA
and other schemes are recorded in the same variable. As noted by Riphahn (2001), this is not a problem
for the estimation of non take-up behavior among eligible families. On the one hand, families receiving
special SA but who are not eligible for regular SA do not enter our group of interest. On the other hand,
families receiving special SA who are also eligible for regular SA are most likely to claim it since they are
already in touch with the bene￿t agency and actively seeking public support.
3.3 Legal Entitlement Rules
We now summarize the basic policy rules as they apply to claimants of regular SA. Eligibility and
entitlement amounts are computed monthly as the di⁄erence between accepted needs and total family
means, according to the simple formula:
SA = Max[0;(M + AC + HCsa) ￿ (Y + HB + FB)]: (1)
The maximum entitlement is composed of a basic amount M to cover essential needs, a supplementary
bene￿t corresponding to additional costs AC and a bene￿t HCsa covering some of the housing costs. The
income assessment accounts for net taxable incomes Y , housing bene￿ts HB and family bene￿ts FB.
On the income side, Y corresponds to the sum of individual incomes of all family members, net
of taxes and mandatory social contributions. This includes earned income, any replacement income
(pensions and unemployment bene￿ts) and incomes from capital. Family bene￿ts, FB, include universal
child bene￿ts and child maintenance bene￿t but exclude some minor bene￿ts. Housing bene￿ts HB
depend on ￿ accepted￿housing costs, which correspond to actual costs, HC, up to a maximum level C(Z).
This ceiling is a function of a set Z of household characteristics (age and size of the dwelling, municipality,
number of inhabitants). Total HB is allocated to each family in proportion to its relative size within the
household.
Similar to minimum-income schemes in most other countries, the basic amount M is a function of
family size and composition, designed to cover necessities. It amounts to 375 or 359 euro ￿depending on
the region ￿for a single individual (2003 ￿gures), 1:7 times this amount for a couple, plus 70% of it for a
￿rst child between 10 and 17 years of age or 63% for a ￿rst child under 10; these last ￿gures are reduced
by 5 percentage points for the second child and by 10 for further children. Accepted additional costs, AC,
consist of work-related expenses (e.g. childcare fees), healthcare expenses and possibly other expenses due
to speci￿c situations. They are conditional on case-by-case judgments of claimants￿economic situations
and, if applicable, can produce payment rates signi￿cantly above regular entitlements. The housing costs
accepted for SA purposes, HCsa, are also ￿xed by municipalities on the basis of local rent level. They
corresponds to those accepted for the computation of housing bene￿ts ￿with the exception of 7% covered
by families themselves since 1997 ￿plus part of the di⁄erence between the ceiling C and the actual costs
6HC when the latter are higher.
4 Measuring Non Take-Up
4.1 Data and Selection
We use the Finnish Income Distribution Survey (IDS), which contains information on incomes, direct
taxes, bene￿ts and socio-economic characteristics of individuals living in private households. The IDS is
a rotating two-year panel, with half of the sample in a given year also retained in the following wave.
We have used the eight waves from 1996 (25,328 individuals) to 2003 (29,070 individuals) as weighted
representative samples of the population of each year. The sample size corresponds to around 0:5% of
the population, with slight variations across years.
Most of the information (income, capital, socio-demographic characteristics) has been collected from
administrative registers. With the exception of interests on deposits, all income items are recorded on
an annual basis and based on the taxation registers (for all taxable incomes) and other speci￿c registers
(e.g. for non-taxable bene￿ts). Some auxiliary information is gathered through interviews conducted
by Statistics Finland on the same households. This is the case for types and duration of activity status
(wage earner, unemployed, pensioner, student, military, other) over the year and for housing costs HC.
The impact of potential measurement errors a⁄ecting these interview variables is discussed below.
Information on actual SA receipt ￿annual SA amount as well as number of months of receipt per
family ￿is also based on registers and does not su⁄er from under-reporting. IDS provides a reasonably
good match with o¢ cial municipal statistics, as assessed by T￿rm￿lehto (2001). The only di⁄erence is
the exclusion of the homeless and those living in institutions (hospitals, nursery homes, prisons or the
military) in IDS.
We restrict our non take-up measures to the group of working or potentially working families. In
particular, students, disabled and pensioners are excluded from the sample we analyze. Students are in
principle not entitled to SA during school terms but a substantial number of them receive some support
according to IDS data. They may work during the summer, may not declare student status during the
year, or bene￿t from discretionary decisions from municipalities depending on their circumstances (e.g.
when waiting for a student loan). Pensioners and disabled also present considerable scope for errors in
eligibility assessment since they are more frequently subject to additional payments from municipalities
(AC) to cover medical expenses, health care, etc. In any case, pensioners are rarely eligible for SA as
the minimum pension is slightly above SA thresholds. More generally, Riihel￿ et al. (2001) show that
pensioners are rarely concerned by income poverty.
4.2 Baseline Eligibility Simulation
Our analysis of non take-up patterns relies on comparing actual SA receipt with a measure of theoretical
SA entitlement for each family according to the legal rules previously described. This section explains
7the practicalities of implementing this simulation using the TUJA model and focuses on those parts of
the calculations where the nature of the data requires adjustments, additional selection or particular
simplifying assumptions.
The application of formula (1) ￿rst requires assessing family means. Like most microsimulation
models, TUJA presents the possibility of calculating tax liabilities and entitlements for a wide range of
social bene￿ts. For computing net incomes Y , taxes and contributions are, however, taken directly from
register data in order to minimize the scope for simulation errors. Bene￿ts HB and FB are also taken
from register data instead of being simulated. This is particularly relevant in our context, as housing
bene￿ts may also be a⁄ected by non take-up (see J￿ntti, 2006). Modeling the simultaneous take-up of
several bene￿ts is outside the scope of the present study (see Hancock et al., 2004).
The accurate simulation of monthly SA entitlements requires establishing income levels for each month
of the year. This is not straightforward, as calendar information (income information for each month) is
lacking. The same issue arises for instance in Riphahn (2001) and many similar studies. To deal with
this problem, we use information on the number of months in each possible status (months in part-time
or full-time employment, unemployment, etc) together with data on annual income by source (earnings,
unemployment bene￿t, etc.). This information allows us to reconstruct monthly income for each relevant
period during the year assuming that income levels do not change during each labor market spell.4
Importantly, bene￿t agencies do not consider housing assets of owner-occupiers in the wealth test.
More generally, it is unlikely in practice that claimants would have to realize property titles in order to
become entitled to SA. Income from capital is, however, considered in the means test and essentially
taken from tax registers (with the exception of interests from deposits).
The computation of the basic amount is a function of the family composition.5 The main di¢ culty in
assessing needs pertains to uncertainties about additional costs, AC, and accepted housing costs, HCsa.
Both are subject to discretionary decisions of municipalities. For housing costs, the ceiling C is fully
determined by o¢ cial rules and register information on household characteristics. Yet, actual costs, HC,
are originating from the complementary interview-based survey and probably understated, as indicated
by the fact that a minority of households declare no or small housing costs even though they receive
housing bene￿ts. Using available data, we are able to account only for some of the AC (childcare fees).
These costs are necessarily underestimated, as indicated by the comparison of observed and simulated
4Monthly family incomes cannot be reconstructed reliably in the case of families where more than one adult changes
status during the year. We have therefore dropped these families from the selected sample, which leads to a reduction of
the sample size of less than 5%. Some duration information on the receipt of capital income, housing bene￿ts and family
bene￿ts exists but is not readily usable. The most reasonable hypothesis is therefore to assume that these incomes are
spread evenly over the year.
5Note however that demographic information used to compute SA corresponds to family characteristics at the end of
each year. Demographic changes at the family level (birth, divorce, etc.) during the year could lead to incorrect assessments
of family needs and SA entitlements. To investigate this potential problem, we have exploited the panel dimension of the
data in order to identify families whose demographic make-up changes during the year. Such changes are rare enough not
to a⁄ect results in any signi￿cant way (details available upon request).
8SA aggregates for families who are both eligible and receiving the bene￿t. To improve this match, AC
are set uniformly at 20% of the family-speci￿c amount M in our baseline. In the Appendix, we present
a sensitivity analysis to assess the elasticity of our measures with respect to alternative values of both
AC and HCsa. Results show that the non take-up rate is relatively stable even for substantial changes
in these variables.
4.3 Results
Figure 2 describes the balance between eligible and recipient families in our selected sample during the
economic recovery and the early 2000s. There is a gradual increase in non take-up from 40% in 1997 up
to around 50% in 2003. Underlying this upwards trend is a relatively stable population of eligible families
(except year 1998) combined with a declining numbers of recipients. We suggest possible explanations
for this pattern in the ￿nal section. Notice that non take-up in terms of SA amounts follow a similar
trend.
Non take-up turns out to be substantial in Finland, providing ample motivation for examining driving
factors more closely. It appears to be of the order of previous results for Germany or France as surveyed
in Table 1. It is lower than previous evidence for Nordic countries. In particular, an estimate of 44%
for year 1996 di⁄ers signi￿cantly from the rate of 60% reported by Virjo (2000) using 1995 data, which
con￿rms the aforementioned presumption that interview-based data lead to overestimations. Figure 2
also includes a broader measure of non take-up obtained by including recipients who are deemed eligible
on the basis of actual receipt but not according to our simulation. Those cases may correspond to other
forms of SA than the regular scheme or to assessment errors (beta-error), as further discussed below. They
mechanically decrease the non take-up rate and therefore provide a lower bound, roughly 10 percentage
points below the baseline measure.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the pooled sample (years 1996 to 2003). A number of
observations can be made. Eligible families, claiming or not, are more often singles and have fewer children
than non-eligible families. Those failing to take up SA are more likely to have access to resources other
than employment and replacement incomes: 15% are reported to own at least some capital (compared
to only 5% in the take-up group), while the heads of almost one fourth of all non take-up families are
self-employed (3% in the take-up group and 11% in the non-eligible group). Non take-up families also
own their dwelling more frequently. In line with expectations, the majority of families claiming SA receive
unemployment assistance. Correspondingly, the heads of these families also experience longer spells of
unemployment. Again as expected, income levels are lower in the take-up group. Monthly average SA
entitlements are only slightly higher in this group. By contrast, annual entitlement amounts are 2,520
euros for the claimants and 2,320 euros for non-claimants, re￿ ecting longer (potential) SA spells among
claiming families.
For 2003, Figure 3 reports non take-up by vintiles for the ￿rst half of the distribution of equivalized

























































































Proportion of eligible families (TUJA simulations) within the selected sample
Proportion of recipients (IDS data) within eligible families
Non take-up rate (caseloads)
Non take-up rate (caseloads), including other SA and beta-error
Non take-up rate (amounts)
Figure 2: Trend in Non-take-up (selected sample)








single 0.47 0.80 0.78
age of head 40 37 36
presence of children 0-2 0.09 0.11 0.08
presence of children 3-5 0.09 0.09 0.09
presence of children 6-11 0.17 0.13 0.14
presence of children 12-17 0.17 0.09 0.11
own home 0.65 0.13 0.51
average gross income (euro/year) 30,813 6,908 7,863
with financial capital 0.18 0.05 0.15
with debt 0.08 0.04 0.09
living in Helsinki 0.29 0.24 0.26
head is farmer or self-employed 0.11 0.03 0.23
family receives unemployment benefit 0.19 0.24 0.22
family receives unemployment assistance 0.13 0.71 0.34
head: no. month as unemployed 1 7 3
head: no. month as salary earner 9 3 5
head holds primary education 0.22 0.39 0.29
head holds lower secondary education 0.41 0.44 0.47
head holds upper secondary education 0.18 0.09 0.13
head holds tertiary education 0.20 0.08 0.11
average SA amount (observed) (euro/month) 271
average SA amount (simulated) (euro/month) 234 230
Sources: IDS administrative data and simulations using the microsimulation model TUJA.
10vintile while poverty at 60% of the median corresponds to the second vintile and part of the third.
The comparison of eligibility and recipiency levels is striking. At the bottom of the distribution, SA is
theoretically well targeted to the poorest but partly fails to reach them in practice, precisely because of
non take-up. For higher income groups, a substantial proportion of the recipients are probably concerned
by other types of SA than the main scheme, which corresponds to families with particularly needs at
some point in time but not concerned by poverty in the long run. This overall picture is consistent with
the ￿ndings of Aho and Virjo (2002) who show that receipt of SA is only weakly correlated with income
poverty.
Another limit to the SA coverage is that 40% of the poorest (￿rst vintile) are actually receiving SA but
not enough to be taken over the poverty line. The poorest group of recipients is composed mostly of single
individuals for whom SA amounts are indeed below the half median. The following vintiles are composed
more frequently of families with larger housing costs or larger needs due to children, who thereby receive
larger SA amounts and escape from poverty. Notice in particular that the implicit equivalence scale of
SA is more generous to families with children than the modi￿ed OECD scale used to adjust incomes.
Underlying lower non take-up rates in these vintiles, compared to the ￿rst one, are precisely due to the
fact that claiming SA helps those families to escape poverty.
Beyond the ￿fth vintile, extremely high non take-up rates may be linked to higher stigma among
families who are eligible but not poor. More likely, it may be explained by errors in our eligibility
assessment. As a matter of fact, most of the recipients in these higher income groups are not found
eligible according to our simulations. As stated above, those correspond to other forms of SA than the
regular scheme. It may also be the case that we ￿ miss￿eligibility for those families since we do not observe
potentially high needs (e.g. high housing costs), or speci￿c needs at some point in the year, typically
not recorded in the data. Importantly, the error potentially committed is concentrated in higher income
while it is very small in the poor population, i.e. our primary target. We nonetheless investigate the
￿ other SA and beta-error￿group in detail in the Appendix to check the overall validity of our simulations.
5 Estimation and Decomposition
In this last section, we focus on the group deemed eligible according to our baseline simulation and
estimate the non take-up binary decision. We then attempt to explain the notable increase in non
take-up rates since 1997 by decomposing the observed trend between factor and coe¢ cient e⁄ects.
5.1 Estimating Non Take-up
The claiming decision can be rationalized by a simple structural interpretation following Pudney et al.
(2002) or Mo¢ tt (1983).6 The entitlement level SA￿ = B(Y;X) depends on a vector of incomes Y
6Note we do not explicitly address the simultaneity of labor supply and take-up decisions. This has been done in a
limited number of studies surveyed by Brewer (2003), mostly concerned by the take-up of in-work bene￿ts and focusing on
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Figure 3: Non-take-up across Income Levels (selected sample, 2003)
and a vector X of family socio-demographic characteristics. The hypothesized disutility of claiming the
bene￿t might be information costs (￿nding out about entitlement programs and understanding relevant
rules), process or transaction costs (e.g. time required to ￿ll in forms or attend interviews) or outcome
costs (stigma). This disutility may be represented in cash equivalents as a positive cost eZ￿+" which
depends on a vector Z of characteristics and a random term " representing unobserved heterogeneity
and optimization error. A family does not claim the bene￿t if the costs more than o⁄set the gain, i.e.
SA￿ < eZ￿+", or equivalently if the ￿ non take-up propensity￿ :
N￿ = Z￿ ￿ lnSA￿ + "
is positive. Assuming that " follows a normal distribution of zero mean leads to the standard probit
model.7 The cost-bene￿t interpretation above justi￿es the presence of the entitlement level SA￿, even
though it presents di¢ culties in terms of identi￿cation.8 The marginal e⁄ect of lnSA￿ is a priori unknown
and not forced to equal unity in our estimations.
labor supply issue when focusing on the take-up of social transfers by pensioners (cf. Pudney, 2001, Pudney et al. 2002,
Hancock et al., 2004, 2006).
7Non-parametric or semi-parametric techniques could also be appropriate here in order to relax assumptions about the
error terms. See, for example, Pudney (2001).
8If vector Z contains the set of individual/family characteristics X used in the bene￿t computation B(Y;X) as well as
the various incomes Y , then the entitlement level SA￿ is only identi￿ed by parametric restriction or thanks to possible
non-linearity or discontinuity in the function B(Y;X). In the present case, SA is means-tested on the income Y net of tax
and contribution, which is a nonlinear function of gross income (and individual characteristics). Some exclusion restrictions
may also apply. Nonetheless, non-parametrically identi￿cation is unlikely to be obtained. See Pudney (2001) on this issue.
12Our speci￿cation (vector Z) includes variables that might plausibly be associated with implicit claim-
ing costs, or more generally, determinants of claiming behavior. To facilitate interpretation, Table 3
reports marginal e⁄ects on the probability of non take-up rather than coe¢ cients. Results are obtained
for each year individually and for the pooled waves, distinguishing between the full sample of eligible
families and the sub-group of long-term unemployed (last column), de￿ned as families with all adults
working less than two months over the year. The baseline speci￿cation shows a satisfactory ￿t and the
signi￿cance of most variables is robust to changes in the speci￿cation.
In the pooled data, all coe¢ cients are signi￿cant with the exception of the number of children. In
separate cross-sections, several coe¢ cients are consistently signi￿cant, with the same sign and fairly close
magnitudes in all or most of the years, suggesting stable determinants of non take-up over time, including
being owner of one￿ s dwelling, being self-employed and receiving unemployment assistance. Explaining
the potential factors a⁄ecting claiming behavior requires much caution, however, since multiple and
con￿ icting interpretations are possible (see the discussion in Remler et al., 2001).
A ￿rst type of explanation pertains to pecuniary determinants and expected duration in assistance.
Higher amounts of SA entitlements signi￿cantly reduce the probability of non-take up in most years, as
often found in the literature.9 Expected permanent income typically exceeds current income for certain
groups, which could explain in particular why self-employed workers have a higher probability of non
take-up.10 Families who own their dwelling have also a higher permanent income or higher earnings
pro￿le, which may explain their larger non take-up propensity. The income of other families living in
the same household increases non take-up, indicating that intra-household transfers partly substitute for
government bene￿ts.
Duration in unemployment is di¢ cult to proxy but may contribute to higher non take-up. The
presence of young children ￿signi￿cant for the pooled sample and for two of the years ￿may indicate
more limited employment opportunities due to childcare obligations and larger take-up, in particular for
single parents. This is con￿rmed by an alternative speci￿cation with a term interacting single status and
presence of young children. Results also con￿rm that those already in long-term unemployment have a
substantially higher claiming propensity. First, the number of months spent out of work is signi￿cant,
con￿rming that duration in welfare assistance plays a role. The receipt of unemployment assistance is
also signi￿cant, indicating that families in touch with bene￿t agencies are more likely to make a claim
for SA as well (see Saarela, 2004); this may be due to lower stigmatization or lower information costs.
Other variables are di¢ cult to interpret. Lower education (primary schooling only) may proxy lower
earnings potential and longer unemployment spells, thereby causing more reliance on income support.
Alternative interpretations pertain to variations in social and psychological costs. More socially active
9The elasticity is very small however. Evaluated by simulation over the whole sample (pooled years), a 10% increase in
SA translates into a decrease in the non take-up probability of around 0.5 percentage points, to be compared for instance
to 2 points in Riphahn (2001). Depending on the year, the decrease varies between 0.3 and 0.8.
10Riihel￿ et al. (2001) indicate that in Finland, self-employment is one of the main contributors to poverty headcount
when measured in income terms, but a small contributor for consumption-based measures.
13persons, e.g. self-employed or better-educated, may su⁄er higher stigma costs while those seen as ￿needy￿
according to prevailing social norms may face smaller costs under this heading. The positive sign on ￿ lower
education￿does not invalidate these interpretations but does reject the possibility that low educated
applicants face larger information costs. The number of children is also signi￿cant and may indicate
larger needs and higher motivation for parents to resort to the welfare system. Age is a signi￿cant factor
in the pooled sample and has a negative parabolic e⁄ect. The ￿nding that take-up increases with age is
rather counter-intuitive and also appears in Riphahn (2001). In the present study however, some of the
youngest (students) and oldest (pensioners) groups, who typically take-up more, are not present in our
selection. Estimates on the pooled sample show that men tend to take-up more.
Regional dummies may indicate variations in information and transaction costs between rural and
urban regions.11 Anonymity of big urban areas may also protect applicants from stigmatization. Yet,
coe¢ cients are signi￿cant only for two of the years. They are, however, signi￿cant in the pooled sample,
which is consistent with di⁄erentiated take-up trends across regions. It may also re￿ ect to some extent the
variability in municipalities￿generosity over years. Year dummies measuring year ￿xed-e⁄ects in relation
to 1996 are highly signi￿cant, except for 1997, and con￿rm the time pattern previously discussed.
Finally, results for the group of long-term unemployed are qualitatively similar but mostly with larger
elasticities of the stable determinants. Exceptions are the role of unemployment assistance and the
entitlement level log(SA); the sub-sample is indeed more homogenous with respect to these variables.
5.2 Decomposing Recent Trends
This section takes a closer look at the increasing trend in non take-up rates as discussed earlier (Figure
2) and suggests three possible explanations. Firstly, we hypothesize that a change in the composition of
the eligible group may explain the fall in claiming rates, and in particular the decreasing proportion of
long-term unemployed over the period (Figure 1, see also Aho and Virjo, 2002). Indeed, this group has
been consistently characterized by a higher propensity to claim.
Secondly, it is possible that claiming behavior has changed during the period under consideration.
Any negative stigma e⁄ects associated with claiming welfare bene￿ts may be felt more acutely during
or after economic recovery than during recession periods. Indeed, sociological studies suggest that an
important determinant of stigma is the perceived normality of the behavior concerned so that the number
of people experiencing economic hardship is likely to be a relevant factor. There is some evidence for
Sweden supporting this type of explanation.12 A related interpretation is that, relative to job-search
11More generally, information pertaining to transaction cost is very limited. More would be needed to proxy the cost of
making or renewing claim: time requirement, unpleasantness of the claims, work requirements (public work), number of
interactions with agency (reporting), job-search activity by claimants, etc.
12Mood (2004) studies youth unemployed in Stockholm region during and after the 1990s recession and shows that the
number of SA recipient has substantial e⁄ects on the propensity of take-up. Her results indicate that the level of SA in one
year has a positive (negative) e⁄ect on the next year￿ s in￿ow (out￿ow) of SA recipients, after controlling for other take-up
determinants, lending support to the hypothesis of a self-reinforcing process. Evidence presented by Gustafsson (2002) for
the same period points in the same direction.
14Table 3: Estimation of Non Take-up
Variable
Head: Age -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.014 * 0.003 -0.017 ** -0.018 *** -0.012 ** -0.009 *** -0.017 ***
Head: Age square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 * 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
Head: 1 low education -0.057 -0.074 * -0.181 *** -0.054 -0.068 ** -0.112 *** -0.137 *** -0.097 *** -0.071 ***
1 Child 0-2 -0.020 0.011 -0.079 -0.230 *** -0.009 -0.147 ** -0.047 -0.003 -0.050 ** -0.041
# Children -0.015 0.001 -0.019 0.003 -0.024 * 0.013 -0.001 -0.006 -0.007 -0.011
1 Single -0.108 * 0.027 -0.089 -0.173 *** -0.099 ** -0.071 -0.083 ** -0.107 ** -0.089 *** -0.003
1 Male Head (couple) -0.131 ** -0.042 0.008 -0.096 -0.083 -0.105 -0.079 -0.056 -0.068 *** -0.013
1 Own home (owner) 0.181 *** 0.244 *** 0.261 *** 0.164 *** 0.144 *** 0.176 *** 0.191 *** 0.189 *** 0.198 *** 0.227 ***
1 Own home (mortgage) 0.127 *** 0.174 *** 0.162 *** 0.165 *** 0.077 ** 0.095 ** 0.131 *** 0.181 *** 0.149 *** 0.151 ***
Other family's income (euro/year) 0.002 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.007 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 ***
1 Capital 0.147 ** 0.156 *** 0.049 0.131 *** 0.151 *** 0.124 *** 0.069 * 0.115 *** 0.125 *** 0.173 ***
1 Self-emp. 0.197 *** 0.190 *** 0.262 *** 0.265 *** 0.172 *** 0.207 *** 0.149 *** 0.203 *** 0.218 *** 0.358 ***
1 Unemp. assist. -0.364 *** -0.203 *** -0.197 *** -0.214 *** -0.128 *** -0.152 *** -0.185 *** -0.146 *** -0.195 *** -0.157 ***
#  Unemp. months -0.024 *** -0.015 *** -0.007 0.000 -0.009 *** -0.007 ** -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 ***
log (SA) -0.034 ** -0.002 -0.045 *** -0.073 *** -0.027 ** -0.034 *** -0.040 *** -0.055 *** -0.040 *** -0.026 ***
Year dummies 1997 0.008 0.030
(ref: 1996) 1998 0.050 ** 0.036
1999 0.058 *** 0.041
2000 0.095 *** 0.097 ***
2001 0.088 *** 0.088 ***
2002 0.101 *** 0.092 ***
2003 0.066 *** 0.070 **
Significant regional controls
(LR test at 10%)
No. observations
Pseudo R2
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15costs, the transaction cost involved in claiming bene￿ts is likely to be higher when labor markets are
strong and unemployment is low. Empirically, such changes in claiming attitudes should translate into
signi￿cant di⁄erences between the coe¢ cients of the non take-up models for di⁄erent years.
A third type of explanation is not related to individual choices but hinges on (unobserved) changes
in administrative practices, including stricter enforcement of eligibility requirements and ￿activation￿
measures (see Aust and Arriba, 2004). In fact, the 1998 Social Assistance Act has strengthened work
incentives through bene￿t cut-backs and, importantly, introduced sanctions amounting to 20% to 40% of
the full bene￿t amount in case of non-compliance with training and job-search obligations. Yet, bene￿t
reductions do not change recipiency per se, at least not directly.13 Another activation plan, the 2001 Act
on Rehabilitative Work, aim to tackle long-term unemployment of young workers. Those aged under 25
are o⁄ered work or training after three months of unemployment that they may not refuse, at risk of
losing unemployment assistance bene￿ts. In fact, the estimated coe¢ cients of our single-year models for
2001-2003 show that young individuals apparently take up less, which would be consistent with stricter
activation measures applying to younger SA recipients. Notice that a greater emphasis of activation
measures is consistent with the falling proportions of unemployment assistance recipients and therefore
with the ￿rst type of explanation.
To shed some light on the relative merit of these di⁄erent explanations, we utilize a variant of the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, adapted to the context of the binary model presented above (see Fairlie,
2005). Essentially, we decompose the di⁄erence in predicted non take-up rates between 1997 (the lowest
rate) and 2002 (the highest) into a contribution of estimated coe¢ cients and a contribution of character-
istics. The di⁄erence amounts to 14 percentage points for the whole sample and 12 points for long-term
unemployed.
According to Table 4, the change in sample characteristics explains most of the di⁄erence over time
for the full selection of eligible families, which suggests the importance of the composition e⁄ect. More
detailed results on the change in characteristics, available upon request, show that it is mainly due to a
decrease in the number of unemployment assistance recipients and unemployment durations. Increasing
numbers of eligible individuals with owned accommodation as well as self-employed also play a role. In
contrast, the second explanation, emphasizing changes in take-up attitudes, receives little support. The
small coe¢ cient e⁄ect that can be observed concerns mainly the dummies for unemployment assistance
and self-employment.
Since the change in the proportion of long-term unemployment is an important element to explain
the characteristic e⁄ect in the full selection, it is not surprising to see its role diminished when looking
at the sub-sample of long-term unemployed. Yet, the characteristic e⁄ect still dominates, con￿rming the
role of the reduction in unemployment assistance spells. This suggests that the reduction in eligibility
to the unemployment assistance due to activation policies may have also played a role. The increased
13More strictly enforced bene￿t sanctions may, however, act as a deterrent for some potential claimants and alter take-up
behavior as discussed above.
16proportion of self-employed and age levels also account for some of the characteristic e⁄ect, the latter
indicating that the 2001 Act may have had some e⁄ect on the eligibility of younger unemployed.14
Table 4: Decomposition of the 1997-2002 Gap in the Non-take-up Probability
1997 2002 gap Coefficients Characteristics
Whole selection 40% 54% 14 9% 91%
Long term unemployed 32% 44% 12 28% 72%
Note: decomposition of predicted gap between coefficient and characteristic effects (Fairlie, 2005)
Decomposition Non-take-up rates
6 Concluding Remarks
Whether low-income families receive government support to which they are formally entitled has ma-
jor implications for the e⁄ectiveness of social policy in general and the target e¢ ciency of anti-poverty
programs in particular. Little is known about the nature of bene￿t take-up in northern European coun-
tries, although there is often a presumption that safety nets in these countries would be less ￿ leaky￿
than elsewhere. In this paper, we have provided some evidence of substantial non take-up in Finland.
Stable factors seem to act in favor of higher claiming costs (owning one￿ s home, being self-employed) or
inversely to encourage take-up (being in long-term employment and receiving unemployment assistance),
consistently over the eight years under study and in line with results for other countries (see Hernanz et
al., 2004). Non-take-up turns out to increase over the 1997-2002 period following the end of the severe
1990s recession. A simple decomposition analysis suggests that this pattern is mainly driven by a change
in the composition of the eligible group and particularly a declining proportion of long-term unemployed.
What have we learned about the relationship between take-up behavior, poverty and the targeting
e¢ ciency of SA schemes? In theory, the Finnish regular SA scheme seems well targeted to the poorest
population. More than 90% (resp. 70%) of those below the half median (resp. between 50% and 60% of
the median) are indeed eligible, against 5% of the non-poor. In practice, only half of the poor actually
receive SA precisely because of non take-up. Accordingly, increasing claiming rates may substantially
reduce the incidence of income poverty, even in a country like Finland where poverty rates are relatively
low.15 In addition, SA only partly alleviates poverty since around 40% of the ￿rst vintile remains below
14An interesting focus on unemployment of young workers and previous activation reforms for that group is provided by
Virjo (2004).
15Using a poverty line at half median, the poverty rate among working age families (6%) is slightly larger than for the
whole population (4% according to Statistic Finland, 2001 or Riihel￿, 2001) since it excludes pensioners who mostly tend
to be non-poor in Finland. Nonetheless, it is interesting to compare results with Germany, a country characterized by a
similar SA scheme, a fairly high non take-up and a larger poverty rate (9%). Using the German Socio-Economic Panel,
microsimulation results from Mantovani and Sutherland (2003) and take-up estimates from Kayser and Frick (2000), we ￿nd
that a larger poverty rate in Germany can be partly explained by a larger non-coverage of the poor population compared
to Finland. For the rest, roughly half of the poverty headcount is attributed to non take-up in both countries.
17the poverty line despite receipt of SA. This group is mainly composed of single individuals for whom
SA amounts are below the half median. In contrast, families with higher needs tend to take-up more
frequently and escape from poverty precisely thanks to the receipt of SA and the generous implicit
equivalence scale of the regular scheme.
Our contribution shows that despite the use of register data, measuring non-take-up is a di¢ cult task
and data requirements are high. At best, one would expect detailed administrative information on house-
hold characteristics, incomes and bene￿ts; monthly calendar information on income ￿ ows; representative
sample; and, ideally, panel dimension. However, even rich and accurate household data often leave room
for uncertainties when modeling bene￿t entitlements. In particular, little is known about administrative
practices, which can di⁄er between individual o¢ ces and are likely to be decisive in determining the
outcomes of entitlement decisions. For the 1996-2003 period, the assessment of family needs was clearly
underestimated and we have attempted to handle the issue in a simple sensitivity analysis. Further re-
search is necessary and may exploit regional variation in SA payments to study potential di⁄erences in
practices.
More generally, incentives of bene￿t agencies are an important area for further research, in relation
with the role of decentralized budgets which can help to internalize the cost of the agency￿ s entitlement
decisions. In Sweden and Denmark, half of the social budget must be covered by local authorities while
only 20% of social protection was ￿nanced by municipalities in Finland for the period considered in this
study.16 Yet, a noticeable transfer of responsibility from the central government towards municipalities
has occurred in the recent years, accompanied by the necessary change in funding, i.e. a decrease in
state income taxation and an increase in municipal taxes. Hiilamo et al. (2004) also documents policy
changes aimed at unifying the standards across municipalities and encouraging local authorities to use
preventative SA. Since 2003, this has led some municipalities, previously more generous, to cut back on
their SA practices.
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Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis of Non Take-up Measures
An important aspect of any robustness test is how well eligibility simulations match up with SA receipt
recorded in the data. In particular, the group of recipients who are not eligible according to our simulations
may reveal other types of SA than the main scheme or simulation errors due to timing issues or incomplete
information about needs (beta-error), as discussed extensively in the text. Most importantly, the average
income in this group is three times larger than that of eligible families who take up SA, and most of the
group is concentrated in vintiles 3 to 6. It is therefore not our main group of interest. Interestingly, it
also di⁄ers qualitatively from claiming families as it is composed more frequently of couples with children,
and hence characterized by potentially larger needs and higher risk of assessment error in this respect.
We can decompose explanations in three categories. This group may simply correspond to other
forms of SA (non-regular, discretionary or preventative SA), which we unfortunately cannot identify.
Discrepancies may also be due to families turning to the bene￿t agency for help with temporary situations
of increased ￿nancial need, typically not recorded in the data. Both cases are characterized by very short
spells of welfare assistance. This is con￿rmed by Figure 4, showing that 62% of recipients who are found
ineligible receive SA for 3 months or less over the year. This is in sharp contrast with the much longer
SA spells of families who are both eligible and receiving regular SA (labeled as ￿take-up￿families). The
third and remaining category may be due to imperfect entitlement simulations of regular SA due mainly

























Figure 4: Distribution of bene￿t duration: Beta Error vs Take-up families
To investigate the ￿rst possibility, we assess the sensitivity of non take-up and the size of ￿ beta-error￿
to +5% and +15% variations in family-speci￿c additional costs AC and accepted housing costs HCsa
respectively. These changes were chosen on the basis of the discussion in the main text, which indicates
that family needs tend to be underestimated in the baseline simulations. For completeness, we also
examine a reduction (￿5%) of the two variables in order to test for symmetry around the baseline. To
distinguish between the understatement of family needs and the lack of calendar information for incomes,
we consider the sub-group of ￿ longer-term unemployed￿ , de￿ned here as families employed less than two
months over the year. By construction, this group should be less a⁄ected by timing problems than the
overall sample. Assessing error for long-term unemployed is also important per se since they correspond
to the most vulnerable population within the group of eligible families.
Results reported in Table 5 indeed show that beta-error among longer-term unemployed is only 6%
compared to 15% in the full selection, lending some support to the idea that timing errors are responsible
for a substantial part of the error in the full sample. Most of the error for long-term unemployed (and part
of it for the full sample) can be eliminated by the suggested increase in additional costs AC, con￿rming
that family needs are somewhat understated in our baseline simulations. Negative variations show that
the bias is probably in the upward direction. Results are more sensitive to changes in AC ￿which is
indeed where more information is lacking ￿than to changes in HCsa.17 It is reassuring to see that non
take-up does not vary much around baseline values for variations in both AC and HCsa. As expected,
longer-term unemployed families are characterized by a larger propensity to claim.
17These results are con￿rmed by a sensitivity analysis using random variations of additional and housing costs. Precisely,
measures are averaged over 100 draws of normally distributed errors with zero-mean and standard deviation equal to 10%
of the cost. Simulations suggest fairly narrow con￿dence interval of 4 (resp. 2) percentage points for the beta-error when
additional (resp. housing) costs vary, and 2 points for non take-up rates in both cases.
22Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis (year 2003)
Selected sample Long term unemployed*
non-take-up beta-error non-take-up beta-error
Baseline 0.51 0.15 0.42 0.06
Additional Costs (uniform change)*
-5% 0.504 0.16 0.410 0.07
+5% 0.522 0.13 0.421 0.04
+15% 0.537 0.10 0.426 0.03
Housing Costs (uniform change)
-5% 0.509 0.15 0.422 0.06
+5% 0.521 0.14 0.422 0.06
+15% 0.525 0.13 0.421 0.05
* The change is applied to the total living allowance M+AC. ** Long term unemployed here defined as working less than 2 months per year (represent
57% of the eligible group)
23